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fRom ThE Cap anamur To mare nostrum: 
humaniTaRianism and migRaTion ConTRoLs  
aT ThE Eu’s maRiTimE BoRdERs
Paolo Cuttitta1
1. INTRODUCTION
At the time of writing, the Italian government has announced that operation Mare 
Nostrum – which was presented as a humanitarian mission aimed at rescuing 
lives in the Strait of Sicily, when it was launched in 2013 – will not be extended 
after October 2014. however, saving migrants’ lives and protecting their human 
rights will remain among the declared aims of the Italian and European border 
policies and practices.
Indeed, humanitarian concerns have progressed towards centre stage in the 
public discourse about migration and border controls in the last decade. While 
earlier stages of the Europeanisation of migration and border policies were 
framed mainly, if not solely, in security terms, the humanitarian narrative was 
gradually incorporated into the language of European policy-makers after the 
turn of the century.2
Nine years before the launch of Mare Nostrum, a rescue operation carried 
out by the German humanitarian ship Cap Anamur had resulted in accusations 
from the Italian authorities of aiding and abetting illegal immigration. Consider-
ing that Mare Nostrum is doing the same thing for which three persons were 
brought to court in 2004, one might think that much has changed after the Cap 
Anamur case. In this paper, I ask the question of what has really changed. In 
order to provide some basis for answering this question, I try to shed some light 
on the history of interceptions and rescue interventions in the Strait of Sicily, 
and to assess the actual function of the operation Mare Nostrum by analysing 
it against the background of Italian and European border policies and, more 
1 I am grateful to Bernd Kasparek, Claudio Matera and Amanda Taylor for their comments on 
an earlier draft of this paper, as well as to Emanuela Roman for her comments on my presentation 
at the conference ‘Le frontiere mobili del Mediterraneo’, Palermo, 3-4 November 2014.
2 See inter alia D. fassin, ‘Compassion and Repression: The Moral Economy of Immigration 
Policies in france’, 20 Cultural Anthropology 2005, 362-387; M. Agier, Managing the Undesirable. 
Refugee Camps and Humanitarian Government (Cambridge: Polity Press 2011); W. Walters, 
‘foucault and frontiers. Notes on the Birth of the humanitarian Border’, in U. Bröckling, S. Kras-
mann and T. Lemke (eds.), Governmentality: Current Issues and Future Challenges (New York: 
Routledge 2011), 138-164; G. Campesi, ‘The Arab Spring and the Crisis of the European Border 
Regime. Manufacturing Emergency in the Lampedusa crisis’, 59 EUI Working Paper RSCAS 
2011, available at <http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/19375/RSCAS_2011_59.
pdf?sequence=1>; P. Cuttitta, ‘Borderizing the Island. Setting and Narratives of the Lampedusa 
Border Play’, 13 Acme: An International E-Journal for Critical Geographies 2014, 196-219.
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specifically, of the cooperation framework established between the two shores 
of the Mediterranean.
Section 2 analyses the rise of the humanitarian narrative in the language of 
European policy documents and Italian laws, as well as of statements made by 
Italian policy-makers. Section 3 makes a comparison between Mare Nostrum 
and previous patrolling activities carried out by Italian authorities in the Strait of 
Sicily, in order to assess whether and in how far Mare Nostrum marks a differ-
ence with the past. Section 4 continues the comparison by taking into consid-
eration the Italian policies of pushing back or deporting migrants, as well as that 
of preventing them from leaving through increased cooperation with North Afri-
can countries. Section 5 summarises a few cases of rescue by private seafarers 
to suggest that non-state actors were de facto discouraged from rescuing peo-
ple without the state’s authorisation, even after the Cap Anamur case. Section 
6 provides an update about the end of Mare Nostrum and the launch of the 
frontex operation Triton.
2. ThE hUMANITARIANISATION Of ThE EUROPEAN SEA BORDER 
At the EU level, the humanitarianisation of the sea border can be first traced in 
official documents to late 2004. It has been argued, indeed, that the emergence 
of European humanitarianism was a consequence of the Cap Anamur case, 
which sparked the debate on boat migrants that summer.3 In June 2004, while 
cruising the international waters of the Strait of Sicily, the German humanitarian 
ship Cap Anamur came across an inflatable dinghy with 37 people aboard. The 
dinghy had partially deflated and was taking in water, while the engine was 
over-heating and letting off fumes. All passengers were taken on board the Cap 
Anamur.4 They claimed to be Sudanese and declared that they wanted to ask 
for asylum in Europe. The Italian island of Lampedusa was 100 miles (around 
180 km) away, while Malta was almost twice as far.5 Libya was by far closer, 
but it could not be considered as a safe haven.
As the Lampedusa harbour was too small for the Cap Anamur, the shipmas-
ter asked for permission to land at Porto Empedocle, in Sicily, on 29 June. The 
day after, as soon as the permission was granted, the humanitarian ship head-
ed northwards. Immediately before the Cap Anamur entered Italian territorial 
waters, however, the Italian authorities suddenly revoked the permission. The 
Berlusconi government declared that it was not its responsibility to receive the 
migrants and examine their asylum applications, and sent navy ships and heli-
copters in order to prevent the German vessel from crossing the sea border. 
Germany, as the flag state of the Cap Anamur, declared it was not responsible 
either. Both Italy and Germany attempted to pass the buck to Malta, arguing 
3 See S. Mezzadra and B. Neilson, Border as Method, or, the Multiplication of Labor (Dur-
ham/London: Duke University Press 2013), 170-171.
4 E. Bierdel, Ende einer Rettungsfahrt. Das Flüchtlingsdrama der Cap Anamur (Weilerswist: 
Ralf Liebe 2006), at 65.
5 The exact location was latitude 33°46,5984N, longitude 12°15,4908E. See E. Bierdel, 
supra note 4, at 110.
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that the ship had transited Maltese territorial waters after rescuing the migrants. 
The authorities of Malta denied any involvement, making clear that they had 
never been aware of the Cap Anamur transiting their territorial waters. In any 
case, it would have been difficult to consider a mere passage as an entry in the 
sense of the Council Regulation (EC) No. 343/2003 of 18 february 2003 (here-
after, Dublin regulation).6 furthermore, Malta argued that the Cap Anamur should 
have brought the migrants to Libya, the country closest to the place of rescue. 
In sum, nobody wanted the rescued migrants to land on their territory. 
The dispute went on for eleven days, during which the ship had to wait at 
the border of Italian territorial waters. On 6 July the German and Italian Interior 
ministers, O. Schily and G. Pisanu, deemed it necessary to stick to the Dublin 
regulation and insist that Malta take the migrants, because an exception in this 
case would represent ‘a dangerous precedent and could pave the way for nu-
merous abuses’. According to the two ministers, the Cap Anamur case also 
required ‘clarification in many respects’.7 On the Cap Anamur food started run-
ning out: as a consequence, humanitarian organisations travelled from Sicily to 
ensure basic supply. The prolonged forced waiting time ended up affecting the 
mental balance of the rescued people. Some of them threatened to throw them-
selves overboard. On 11 July the master of the Cap Anamur, fearing that he 
might no longer be able to guarantee the safety of the people on board, declared 
a state of emergency, asked the Italian authorities for permission to land and 
informed them that in the absence of a formal authorisation he would find him-
self constrained to enter the harbour even without the authorities’ consent – which 
is what happened in the end. The German ship met no resistance when it entered 
Italy’s territorial waters without authorisation. however, immediately upon land-
ing at Porto Empedocle, the ship was confiscated while the shipmaster (S. 
Schmidt), the first officer (V. Dachkevitch) and the head of the humanitarian 
organisation Cap Anamur (E. Bierdel) were all detained under the charge of 
aiding and abetting illegal immigration.8
Immediately after the Cap Anamur case, the German Interior Minister, O. 
Schily, proposed the establishment of European reception camps for asylum 
seekers in North Africa, arguing that this would also prevent casualties during 
the sea crossing.9 The proposal was never formalised at EU level. however, 
the European Council of November 2004 recognised ‘that insufficiently managed 
migration flows can result in humanitarian disasters’, expressed ‘its utmost 
concern about the human tragedies that take place in the Mediterranean as a 
result of attempts to enter the EU illegally’ and called ‘upon all States to inten-
6 V. Della fina, ‘Cap Anamur Case, Tribunal of Agrigento, first Criminal Section, Judgment 
of 15 february 2010’, 13 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 2011, at 544.
7 Ministero dell’Interno, ‘La vicenda della nave Cap Anamur all’esame dei Ministri dell’Interno 
Pisanu e Schily’, available at <http://www.interno.gov.it/mininterno/site/it/sezioni/sala_stampa/
comunicati/comunicato_568.html?pageIndex=10&year=2004>.
8 In 2009, after a five-year trial, the court (Tribunale di Agrigento, I Sezione Penale, I Col-
legio. 7 October 2009) acquitted the three accused from all charges, recognizing that they had 
acted for humanitarian reasons and not for profit.
9 See inter alia J. Valluy, ‘La nouvelle Europe politique des camps d’exilés: genèse d’une 
source élitaire de phobie et de répression des étrangers’, 57 Cultures & Conflits 2005, 13-69.
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sify their cooperation in preventing further loss of life’.10 It also declared that it 
would welcome ‘initiatives by Member States for cooperation at sea, on a vol-
untary basis, notably for rescue operations’.11 In 2005 the ‘Global Approach to 
Migration’ – a policy document adopted by the European Council – called on 
frontex to establish a surveillance system using ‘modern technology with the 
aim of saving lives at sea and tackling illegal immigration’.12 Such a surveillance 
system was established in October 2013. It is called Eurosur and aims to 
strengthen the exchange of information and the operational cooperation between 
member states, as well as between them and frontex ‘for the purpose of detect-
ing, preventing and combating illegal immigration and cross-border crime and 
contributing to ensuring the protection and saving the lives of migrants’.13 fi-
nally, after the Lampedusa tragedy, the EU Council of 24-25 October 2013 
expressed ‘its deep sadness at the recent and dramatic death of hundreds of 
people in the Mediterranean which shocked all Europeans. Based on the im-
perative of prevention and protection and guided by the principle of solidarity 
and fair sharing of responsibility’, the Council concluded that ‘determined action 
should be taken in order to prevent the loss of lives at sea and to avoid that 
such human tragedies happen again’14 and that ‘[s]wift implementation by Mem-
ber States of the new European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR) will 
be crucial to help detecting vessels and illegal entries, contributing to protecting 
and saving lives at the EU’s external borders’.15
It was only after the long blame game of July 2004 that the question of rescu-
ing people at sea landed, as such, on the EU agenda as one of the official aims 
of border controls. In Italy, instead, the humanitarianisation of the sea border 
had already become visible in 2002. The amendments made to the Italian im-
migration law that year, introduced stricter penalties for smugglers if the lives 
or physical safety of the smuggled persons have been put at risk during the 
smuggling process, and if the smuggled persons have been subjected to inhu-
man or degrading treatment.16 By doing this, the Italian legislator seemed to 
aim at enhancing the safety of irregular travels in general, by protecting not only 
the right to life, but also the right to physical integrity, the right to be treated 
humanely, and the right not to be tortured. for the first time, the human secu-
10 Council of the European Union, ‘Brussels European Council 4/5 November 2004 Presiden-
cy Conclusions’ (5 November 2004), at 21, available at <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/
cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/82534.pdf>.
11 Ibid., at 25.
12 Council of the European Union, ‘Brussels European Council 15/16 December 2005 Presi-
dency Conclusions’ (30 January 2006), at 10, available at <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/
ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/87642.pdf>.
13 Regulation (EU) No 1052/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 Octo-
ber 2013 establishing the European Border Surveillance System (Eurosur), OJ [2013] L295/11, 
6.11.2013.
14 Council of the European Union, ‘European Council 24/25 October 2013 Conclusions’ (25 
October 2013), at 17, available at <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/
pressdata/en/ec/139197.pdf>.
15 Ibid., at 18.
16 Art. 11 Law No. 189 of 30 July 2002 Modifica alla normativa in materia di immigrazione e di 
asilo [Amendments to the immigration and asylum law], GU [2002] Serie Generale no. 199, Suppl. 
Ordinario n. 173, 26.8.2002.
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rity of migrants was clearly placed at the service of border controls. As this 
paper shows, however, the relationship has never been reciprocal: border con-
trols are not placed at the service of the human security of migrants, because 
their actual aim is to prevent people to reach a place of safety in Europe.
In 2003, the cooperation agreement signed by the Italian government with 
Gadhafi’s Libya was publicly justified with the ‘strong determination’ of both 
parties to ‘jointly tackle criminal organisations devoted to the smuggling of hu-
man beings and the merciless exploitation of clandestine migrants’.17 Similarly, 
the 2007 Italian-Libyan agreement allowing for joint border patrols along the 
Libyan coast was presented as the best way to stop ‘the smugglers’ vessels. 
By doing this, it will be possible to tackle such activities much more effectively, 
thus saving many human lives and disrupting the criminal organisations’.18 In 
2009, when the pushback operations were started, the Italian prime minister 
described them as ‘an act of great humanity […] because they prevent tragedies 
at sea’.19
This is exemplary of a shift taking place from a mostly securitarian approach 
to smuggling, which presented facilitators as criminals harming societies, to the 
mixed securitarian-humanitarian approach, focusing also on the humanitarian 
consequences of crime. Importantly, the stress is put only on the humanitarian 
consequences of smuggling and trafficking activities, and not on the humanitar-
ian consequences of the policies and practices carried out by European and 
North African state authorities.20
17 Ministero dell’Interno, ‘Comunicato stampa. firmata dal Ministro dell’Interno Pisanu un’in-
tesa operativa con la Libia sulle modalità pratiche della collaborazione per la lotta all’immigrazione 
clandestina’ (3 July 2003), available at <http://www.interno.it/mininterno/export/sites/default/it/
sezioni/sala_stampa/comunicati/comunicato_353.html_1278249885.html>.
18 Ministero dell’Interno, 2007a, ‘Notizie. Immigrazione clandestina: il Ministro dell’Interno 
Amato firma a Tripoli un accordo per il pattugliamento congiunto della costa libica’ (29 December 
2007), available at <http://www.interno.it/mininterno/export/sites/default/it/sezioni/sala_stampa/
notizie/immigrazione/0871_2007_12_29_ministro_Amato_firma_a_Tripoli_accordo_per_il_pat 
tugliamento_congiunto.html>.
19 Adnkronos, ‘Migranti, premier: respinti per umanità. Maroni: politica che dà grandi risultati’ 
(25 May 2009), available at <http://www.adnkronos.com/IGN/News/Politica/?id=3.0.3354936348>.
20 See the reports: human Rights Watch, ‘Turned Away. Summary Returns of Unaccompa-
nied Minor Children and Adult Asylum Seekers from Italy to Greece’ (22 January 2013), available 
at <http://www.hrw.org/print/reports/2013/01/22/turned-away>; Médecins Sans frontières, ‘Vio-
lence, Vulnerability and Migration. Trapped at the Gates of Europe. A report on the situation of sub-
Saharan migrants in an irregular situation in Morocco’ (March 2013), available at <http://www.msf.
org/sites/msf.org/files/migrants_in_morocco_report.pdf>; Amnesty International, ‘Scapegoats of 
fear. Rights of Refugees, Asylum-Seekers and Migrants Abused in Libya’ (June 2013), avail-
able at <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE19/007/2013/en/5310f0f7-1ff4-4acd-bfd8-
e3e2c082d7d3/mde190072013en.pdf>; Amnesty International, ‘frontier Europe. human Rights 
Abuses on Greece’s Border with Turkey’ (July 2013), available at <http://www.amnesty.org/en/
library/asset/EUR25/008/2013/en/d93b63ac-6c5d-4d0d-bd9f-ce2774c84ce7/eur250082013en.
pdf>; Pro Asyl, ‘Pushed Back. Systematic human Rights Violations against Refugees in the 
Aegean Sea and at the Greek-Turkish Land Border’ (7 November 2013), available at <http://
www.proasyl.de/fileadmin/fm-dam/l_EU_fluechtlingspolitik/proasyl_pushed_back_24.01.14_
a4.pdf>; Amnesty International, ‘The human Cost of fortress Europe. human Rights Violations 
Against Migrants at Europe’s Borders’ (July 2014), available at <http://www.amnesty.nl/sites/de-
fault/files/public/eur_050012014__fortress_europe_complete_web.pdf>; Jesuit Refugee Service 
Malta, ‘Beyond Imagination. Asylum Seekers Testify to Life in Libya’ (January 2014), available at 
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3. ThE OPERATION MARE NOSTRUM
Since October 2013 a number of vessels, helicopters, airplanes, drones and 
personnel of the Italian Navy, Army, Air force, Carabinieri, Guardia di Finanza, 
Coast Guard and Police have been permanently patrolling the international 
waters of the Strait of Sicily, in search for migrants to be rescued, within the 
operation Mare Nostrum. The mission was launched as early as two weeks 
after 3 October 2013: on that day, 366 people had drowned after their fishing-
boat sank only half a mile before reaching the Italian island of Lampedusa. Al-
though many thousands of people had already died in the attempt to cross the 
Mediterranean before, this particular incident caused an unprecedented sensa-
tion in Italy and Europe alike – because of both the larger number of people 
involved, and the fact that it happened so close to European soil. As a response, 
the Italian government launched Mare Nostrum and presented it as a humani-
tarian mission, whose declared aim was to save human lives. Indeed, around 
100,000 migrants have been rescued by Italian navy ships alone in ten months.21
Because of its life-saving goal, Mare Nostrum has been praised and sup-
ported not only by almost all Italian political parties (the only criticism coming 
from a part of the opposition accusing it of attracting more migrants, and there-
fore also possibly increasing the absolute number of casualties),22 but also by 
humanitarian organisations, which called on the Italian and European institutions 
not to reduce the search and rescue capacity in the Mediterranean after the 
Italian government announced that Mare Nostrum would end because of finan-
cial constraints in October 2014, only a year after its launch.23
<https://www.jrs.net/assets/Publications/file/Beyond-imagination-jesuit-refugee-service-malta-
libya-report.pdf>.
21 On 11 November 2014, at the ‘fundamental Rights and Migration to the EU’ conference, 
organized by the EU fundamental Rights Agency in Rome, the Director of the Central Unit for 
Immigration and Border Police Management of the Italian Interior Ministry, G. Pinto, explained 
that over 155,000 people have been rescued since January 2014. Around 100,000 of them have 
been rescued by Italian navy ships, 30,000 by cargoes and other private vessels contacted by the 
Italian Coast Guard, 25,000 by the Italian Coast Guard as well as by the Italian vessels engaged 
within the frontex Hermes operation.
22 See Camera dei Deputati, ‘Resoconto Stenografico. Seduta di venerdì 16 maggio 2014’ (16 
May 2014), available at <http://documenti.camera.it/leg17/resoconti/assemblea/html/sed0230/
stenografico.pdf> and Camera dei Deputati, ‘Resoconto Stenografico Audizione. Seduta di mar-
tedì 8 aprile 2014’ (8 April 2014), available at <http://documenti.camera.it/leg17/resoconti/com 
missioni/stenografici/pdf/30/audiz2/audizione/2014/04/08/leg.17.stencomm.data20140408.
U1.com30.audiz2.audizione.0004.pdf>. According to frontex, the ‘[r]atio between confirmed fa-
talities and arrivals in the Central Mediterranean during the first eight months of 2014 compared 
to the same period in 2013 increased from an average of 0.4 of confirmed deaths per 1 000 
detections in 2013 to 1.4 per 1 000 detections in 2014’. See frontex, ‘Africa-frontex Intelligence 
Community Joint Report’ (October 2014), at 26, available at <http://ffm-online.org/wp-content/up-
loads/2014/12/AfIC_2013.pdf>. however, the increased surveillance of the Strait of Sicily might 
have drastically reduced the number of both the missing persons and the unreported casualties, 
which would undermine frontex’ theory of an increased mortality rate.
23 See Amnesty.it, ‘Mare nostrum non termini. Amnesty International scrive al governo italiano. 
Domani un convegno a Roma’, 16 October 2014, available at <http://www.amnesty.it/Il-governo-
italiano-non-termini-Mare-nostrum-lettera-a-governo-italiano>, Unhcr.it, ‘Unhcr Expresses Grave 
Concern on the Termination of Mare Nostrum Operation’, 16 October 2014, available at <http://
www.unhcr.it/news/unhcr-profonda-preoccupazione-per-la-fine-delloperazione-mare-nostrum>, 
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however, the Italian operation has not only one, but two declared aims. Al-
though the stress was mainly put on the humanitarian aim of saving lives at sea, 
Mare Nostrum was also presented, from the beginning, as a security mission 
aiming at capturing smugglers. Indeed, besides the thousands of migrants res-
cued, authorities can also boast about the hundreds of smugglers detained. A 
particular event attests to the security nature of the mission: in November 2013, 
an Italian navy vessel spotted a smugglers’ fishing-boat immediately after it had 
left the migrants on a smaller boat on the high seas, and chased the smugglers, 
shooting at their vessel until it sank and the smugglers could be apprehended. 
Indeed, navy ships are used to identify people, to interrogate them and to detect 
smugglers: in order to do this, not only military personnel but also police officers 
are on board. Even if there are dead migrants on board or people reportedly 
missing, Italian authorities on Mare Nostrum vessels only interrogate migrants 
as to their own identity and try to gather information useful for arresting presump-
tive smugglers, while abstaining from any investigation activity that could lead 
to the identification of the dead or missing people. Generally speaking, the fact 
that state authorities regularly collect information and compile statistics regard-
ing the apprehension of live migrants, while they don’t collect or disclose to the 
public systematic data on border deaths,24 is an indicator of their ambiguous 
attitude towards the issue of human security. In the specific case of Mare Nos-
trum, it suggests that the security aims of the Italian operation still outweigh the 
humanitarian ones. furthermore, Mare Nostrum aircraft and vessels are part 
and parcel of the operational cooperation framework that has long been estab-
lished between Italy and North African countries.25 Within such framework, based 
on the provision of training programmes and technical equipment, on practical 
cooperation and exchange of information, migrant boats are intercepted and 
returned by force by Libyan border guards.26
Medicisenzafrontiere.it, ‘Mare Nostrum: Tempo scaduto. Il governo Italiano non può rinnegare 
il proprio impegno di continuare a salvare i profughi in mare’, 17 October 2014, available at 
<http://www.medicisenzafrontiere.it/notizie/comunicato-stampa/mare-nostrum-tempo-scaduto-
il-governo-italiano-non-può-rinnegare-il> and the report of Amnesty International, ‘Lives Adrift. 
Refugees and Migrants in Peril in the Central Mediterranean’ (30 September 2014), available at 
<http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/EUR05/007/2014/en>, at 25.
24 T. Last and T. Spijkerboer, ‘Tracking Deaths in the Mediterranean’, in T. Brian and f. Laczko 
(eds.), Fatal Journeys. Tracking Lives Lost during Migration (Geneva: International Organisation 
for Migration 2014), 85-107; S. Grant, ‘Irregular Migration and frontier Deaths. Acknowledging 
a Right to Identity’, in M.-B. Dembour and T. Kelly (eds.), Are Human Rights for Migrants? Criti-
cal Reflections on the Status of Irregular Migrants in Europe and the United States (Abingdon: 
Routledge 2011), 48-70; I. Kovras and S. Robins, ‘Missing Migrants: Deaths at Sea and Address-
ing Migrant Bodies in Lesbos’, in h. Donnan, M. hurd and Carolin Leutloff-Grandits (eds.), Border 
crossings (Manchester: Manchester University Press forthcoming).
25 See P. Cuttitta, ‘The Case of the Italian Southern Sea Borders: Cooperation across the 
Mediterranean?’, in G. Pinyol (ed.), Immigration flows and the management of the EU’s southern 
maritime borders (Barcelona: Cidob Edicions 2008), 45-62; J.-P. Cassarino (ed.), Unbalanced 
Reciprocities. Cooperation on Readmission in the Euro-Mediterranean Area (Washington D.C.: 
Middle East Institute 2010); L. Bialasiewicz, ‘Off-shoring and Out-sourcing the Borders of EU-
rope: Libya and EU Border Work in the Mediterranean’, 17 Geopolitics 2012, 843-866; P. Cuttitta, 
‘Migration Control in the Mediterranean Grenzsaum. Reading Ratzel in the Strait of Sicily’, 29 
Journal of Borderlands Studies 2014, 117-131.
26 See infra, section 4.
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Once it has been made clear that Mare Nostrum has both a humanitarian 
and a security aim, what deserves to be stressed is that military vessels and 
aircraft are in fact not a novelty in the Strait of Sicily, nor is it a novelty that they 
carry out both rescue missions and security activities. In October 2013 the Ital-
ian government opted less for a qualitative than for a quantitative change, by 
strongly increasing the already existing patrolling activities. Within the operation 
Constant Vigilance, indeed, Italian military vessels and aircraft have been patrol-
ling the Strait of Sicily since 2004. While Constant Vigilance was never pre-
sented as a ‘humanitarian mission’, Mare Nostrum only (yet significantly) 
increased the number of vessels, aircraft and personnel deployed in the frame-
work of the previous operation: the estimated cost of Mare Nostrum is around 
9.5 million Euro per month, whereas the monthly budget of Constant Vigilance 
is only 1.5 million Euro per month. In quantitative terms there is a big difference, 
but in qualitative terms – in terms of what Italian authorities actually do in the 
Strait of Sicily – there is hardly a difference, because Constant Vigilance is also 
engaged in both rescue missions and security activities.
Moreover, if we go further back in time, we realise that military vessels and 
police vessels started patrolling the international waters of the Strait of Sicily as 
early as 1995 – eighteen years before Mare Nostrum, nine years before Constant 
Vigilance. from the beginning, Italian border guards were confronted with the 
duty to rescue people: in 1997, they claimed that they were not able to forcibly 
divert migrant boats back to Tunisia, because migrants sinking their own vessels 
resulted in the legal obligation for authorities to rescue them and bring them to 
Italy.27 Then, from 2002 onwards, the number of navy ships involved in migration 
controls was increased. That year, the Italian immigration law was extensively 
amended. Among other things, the new regulation explicitly allowed for Italian 
ships, within the limits set by international law, to board vessels suspected of 
being involved in smuggling activities, to search them and, if evidence is found 
that the vessels are engaged in the smuggling of migrants, to escort them to an 
Italian port.28 The new regulation was highly publicised by the centre-right gov-
ernment as an important move against illegal immigration. In fact, it could not 
obviously add anything to what Italian authorities were already allowed to do 
according to international law, nor did it add anything to what Italian ships had 
already been doing in international waters. Importantly, the emphasis was main-
ly put on security, not on humanitarian concerns. however, migrants were still 
‘rescued’, first, and then brought to Italy, except in the very rare and excep-
tional cases in which Tunisia accepted to take migrants back from international 
waters, upon the request of Italian authorities that first intercepted the migrants 
and then contacted their Tunisian counterparts.29 In 2003, a governmental decree 
27 See Comitato parlamentare Schengen-Europol, ‘Sopralluogo a Lampedusa (18-19 e 20 
luglio 1997)’, available at <http://www.camera.it/_bicamerali/schengen/sopralluoghi/AGRIGENT.
htm>.
28 Art. 11 Law No. 189 of 30 July 2002, supra note 16.
29 On 21 October 2003, ‘twenty-eight clandestine immigrants were intercepted in three differ-
ent vessels few miles away from Pantelleria and handed over to a Tunisian patrol boat. […] The 
transshipment took place 14 miles south of Pantelleria, in international waters’ (Repubblica.it, 
‘Clandestini in Tunisia, accordo col Viminale’, 21 October 2003, article on file with the author, my 
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was issued to regulate i.a. the ‘continuous patrolling activities’ of Italian navy 
ships and aircraft in international waters. The decree specified that activities 
tackling irregular migration must always aim at ‘safeguarding human life and 
respecting human dignity’.30 Then, in 2004, the operation Constant Vigilance 
was launched, and the activities didn’t change significantly: according to gov-
ernmental guidelines, the priority of interceptions was always rescuing lives.31 
Even in 2011, when arrivals to Southern Italy drastically increased in the wake 
of the Arab Spring, saving lives ‘was at the top in the hierarchy of priorities […], 
at that time maybe in daily operational activities more than in the public 
discourse’.32 With regard to the geographical extent of patrolling activities, Mare 
Nostrum has surely covered on a more regular basis the area close to the bor-
der of Libyan national waters. however, Italian navy aircraft or ships often spot-
ted vessels and carried out rescue interventions tens of miles south of the 
Italian territorial sea, sometimes much closer to the Libyan than to the Italian 
maritime boundary, also in earlier times. for example, this was the case both 
in the period preceding the Cap Anamur case and in the months before the 
Lampedusa tragedy and the launch of Mare Nostrum, with migrants being 
sighted and rescued up to 88 miles south of Lampedusa, as well as up to 170 
miles south-east of Sicily.33
In sum, there seems to have been a continuity in qualitative terms as regards 
the engagement of Italian authorities in rescuing migrants in distress at sea, in 
spite of the humanitarian rhetoric that has been surrounding the Mare Nostrum 
mission since it was launched in October 2013, presenting it as something new. 
The humanitarian side of Italian sea border controls is less novel than it seems, 
instead innovations are apparent in intelligence, most notably the identification 
procedure and the fact that migrants are sometimes held on board for several 
translation). A year later ‘six clandestines intercepted by the Guardia di Finanza 25 miles south 
of Lampedusa were handed over to a Tunisian patrol boat. After receiving first aid assistance 
from the Italian unit, the immigrants […] were handed over to the Tunisian military’ (Ansa.it, s. t., 
22 October 2004, article on file with the author, my translation).
30 Ministero dell’Interno, Decreto Ministeriale 14 luglio 2003. Disposizioni in materia di con-
trasto all’immigrazione clandestina, G.U. serie generale n. 220 of 22.09.2003 (my translation).
31 See Consiglio dei ministri, ‘Documento programmatico relativo alla politica dell’immigrazione 
e degli stranieri nel territorio dello Stato per il 2004-2006’ (6 May 2005), available at <http://www.
governo.it/Presidenza/DICA/immigrazione/DPPI_04052005_2.pdf>.
32 f. Pastore and E. Roman, ‘Implementing Selective Protection. A Comparative Review of 
the Implementation of Asylum Policies at National Level focusing on the Treatment of Mixed 
Migration flows at EU’s Southern Maritime Borders’, FIERI Working Papers 2014, available at 
<http://fieri.it/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/WP_fIERI_fINAL_Implementing-Selective-Protec-
tion_PastoreRoman_Oct-2014.pdf>.
33 See i.a. Repubblica.it, ‘Affonda un altro barcone. Tutti salvi i clandestini’, 19 June 2003, 
available at <http://www.repubblica.it/online/cronaca/sbarcoquattro/salvi/salvi.html>; Repubbli ca.
it, ‘Avvistato, sesto barcone carico di clandestini in 24 ore’, 29 October 2003 (article on file with 
the author); Il Manifesto, ‘Sbarco record a Lampedusa’, 30 October 2003 (article on file with 
the author); Ansa.it, ‘Duecento migranti soccorsi a Lampedusa’, 26 August 2013, available at 
<http://www.ansa.it/web/notizie/rubriche/topnews/2013/08/26/Duecento-migranti-soccorsi-Lam
pedusa_9203202.html>; Repubblica.it, ‘Emergenza sbarchi nel canale di Sicilia soccorsi mille 
migranti su cinque barconi, 17 September 2013, available at <http://palermo.repubblica.it/cro
naca/2013/09/17/news/eemergenza_sbarchi_nel_canale_di_sicilia_soccorsi_mille_migranti_
su_cinque_barconi-66703040/>.
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days before they are brought to land, thus turning navy ships to floating deten-
tion centres.
4. PUShING BACK, DEPORTING AND PREVENTING fROM LEAVING
Of course, rescuing and bringing to Italy is different from pushing back to Libya 
or Tunisia. Indeed, there have been periods when Italy, going far beyond the 
above-described occasional cases in which migrants were handed over to Tu-
nisian authorities on the high seas, carried out pushback operations system-
atically. from 2009 to 2010, for example, migrants were pushed back to Libya 
directly from international waters. In 2012 such practice was ruled unlawful by 
the European Court of human Rights in the Hirsi case – in the only case in 
which a group of deportees were able to file an appeal.34 Even in this period, 
though, intercepted migrants were not left to die.35 When there were people in 
need of medical care on a boat, all passengers were generally taken to Lampe-
dusa first: the persons in need were disembarked, while the others were pushed 
back to Libya from there. The latter case (with people being returned after enter-
ing Italian national waters) recalls to memory the period from October 2004 to 
March 2006, in which over 3,000 people were returned to Libya from Italian 
territory36 (not from international waters, as it was mostly the case in the period 
2009-2010) short after their landing. Incidentally, the people deported from 2004 
to 2006 were also ‘rescued’ first, then they were brought to Lampedusa (or 
other Italian ports), and only later were they returned to Libya.
however, the fact that no pushbacks and no deportations have been carried 
out within the Mare Nostrum framework has nothing to do with the operation 
itself: it has rather to do with the policy that the last three Italian governments37 
decided to follow after the Hirsi case, long before Mare Nostrum, and that even 
previous governments had already followed in the past.
Moreover, the policy of repatriating the so-called ‘economic migrants’ (all 
those – e.g. Egyptian and Tunisian citizens – who can be returned by force 
without blatantly violating the principle of non refoulement) was continued also 
after the launch of Mare Nostrum. Such persons are first rescued, then they are 
brought to Italy, and finally they are returned to their home countries, in so far 
as the home countries cooperate – which they do, at least to some extent. Not 
only does the way in which border patrols operate in the Strait of Sicily remain 
largely unchanged since the launch of Mare Nostrum, but the decisions on 
whether to allow disembarked people to remain in Italian territory or to deport 
34 The Court held that the push-back of 24 Eritrean and Somali people carried out in May 
2009 had violated Art. 3 (prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment), Art. 4 of protocol 4 
(prohibition of collective expulsion) and Art. 13 (right to effective remedy) of the Council of Eu-
rope’s Convention for the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms. See ECthR, 
Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy, Appl. No. 27765/09, 23 february 2012.
35 however, see a contrario section 5 of this paper.
36 See E. Paoletti, The Migration of Power and North-South Inequalities. The Case of Italy 
and Libya (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 2010), at 146.
37 The governments led by M. Monti (November 2011 – April 2013), E. Letta (April 2013 – 
february 2014) and M. Renzi (february 2014 – present).
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them follow the same guidelines that oriented Italian border management before 
Mare Nostrum.
A further crucial feature of Italian and European border policies remains 
stagnant in spite of the increased humanitarian rhetoric surrounding Mare Nos-
trum: the fact that such policies still aim at preventing people from leaving North 
Africa and reaching Europe, regardless of their origin and motivation to migrate. 
While no pushback operations have been carried out from international waters 
by Italian vessels after the Hirsi case, Libyan patrols have carried out many 
interceptions of migrant boats both in Libyan national waters and in interna-
tional waters. Such interceptions are carried out in the interest of Italy and 
Europe, which thus circumvent the principle of non-refoulement through prac-
tices that can be described as ‘preventive refoulement’38 or ‘neo-refoulement’.39
Italy and the EU, indeed, keep making agreements on police cooperation 
with Libya as well as with the other North African countries; they keep providing 
such countries with aid programmes (offering training courses for border guards 
as well as funding for the construction of border police facilities) and techno-
logical equipment (all-terrain vehicles, patrol boats, night vision devices, instru-
ments for the detection of false and falsified documents) in order for them to 
curb irregular migration to and from their territories.
In 2013, for example, the EU started a two-year border and assistance mis-
sion (EU-BAM) in Libya. Its aim is to train and advise Libyan authorities in order 
for them to strengthen border controls and prevent migrants from leaving or 
intercept them on the sea. Italy has been providing technical equipment and 
training programmes for Libyan border guards since 2003 and currently aims 
at resuming joint patrols in Libyan waters.40 During the last EU-Libya meeting, 
in July 2014, the Libyan Prime Minister A. Thinni ‘made a point of thanking the 
Italians, whose country, he said, had generously supplied Libya with boats to 
prevent migrant vessels from leaving Libya’s waters’. Thinni also ‘asked for EU 
cooperation especially in training, technology and the construction of new deten-
tion centres. He requested that three new centres be constructed in Libya’.41
This is particularly disconcerting, however, given that it is well known that 
torture and inhuman and degrading treatments are part of everyday life in Lib-
yan detention centres, as numerous reports of human rights organisations have 
documented. In April 2014, for example, human Rights Watch interviewed 138 
migrants and asylum seekers who were detained in Libya: 100 of them (over 
38 C. Marchetti, ‘Expanded Borders: Policies and Practices of Preventive Refoulement in 
Italy’, in M. Geiger and A. Pécoud (eds.), The Politics of International Migration Management 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 2010), 160-183.
39 J. hyndman and A. Mountz, ‘Another Brick in the Wall? Neo-Refoulement and the Exter-
nalization of Asylum by Australia and Europe’, 43 Government and Opposition 2008, 249-269.
40 Stranieriinitalia.it, ‘Profughi. Pinotti: Accoglienza nelle caserme, l’Onu in Libia contro gli 
sbarchi’, 3 July 2014, available at <http://www.stranieriinitalia.it/attualita-profughi._pinotti_ac 
coglienza_nelle_caserme_l_onu_in_libia_contro_gli_sbarchi_18948.html>.
41 Libyaherald.com, ‘Libya wants EU partnership to fight illegal migration’, 11 July 2014, 
available at <http://www.libyaherald.com/2014/07/11/libya-wants-eu-partnership-to-fight-illegal-
migration/#axzz376kwszqe>.
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72 per cent of the sample) declared they had been tortured or abused.42 Libyan 
officials also impose bribes on detained migrants who want to be released from 
endless incommunicado detention.
Life in Libya is not much easier for migrants outside the detention centres. 
They run the risk of being killed by border guards when they try to enter Libyan 
territory (alone in June 2014 twelve people were shot dead after crossing the 
border from Sudan),43 and they also happen to be shot at when they try to set 
off towards Europe.44 More generally, they are subjected to exploitation and 
grave abuses from the local authorities, employers and population, as well as 
from their own smugglers.
for migrants, indeed, there is hardly a difference between being pushed back 
by Italian authorities from international waters and being intercepted and returned 
(be it from Libyan national waters or from the high seas) or being prevented 
from leaving by Libyan authorities. The only difference is that, theoretically, those 
pushed back by Italy have the right to file a claim with the European Court of 
human Rights. however, such right can hardly be exercised in practice once 
people have been deported.
The European policy of trying to prevent people from leaving Libyan land 
and sea territory, as well as to let Libya push them back from international wa-
ters on behalf of Europe (and with the support of European funding, equipment 
and training programmes), results in people being abused and their right to 
physical integrity to be violated in Libya rather than on the sea, in spite of the 
humanitarian rhetoric of European migration and border policies. Significantly, 
ten years after the first proposal to establish reception centres in Africa, the 
Italian Interior Minister, A. Alfano, took up the proposal again, arguing that this 
would prevent the ill-treatment of migrants by smugglers as well as deaths at 
sea.45 Once again, humanitarianism is used in order to justify policies aimed at 
preventing people from reaching a place of safety in Europe. 
42 A 33-year old Eritrean man described the treatment reserved to people who had been 
caught while trying to escape: they ‘stripped off their shirts, threw water all over them, and then 
whipped them with rubber on their backs and heads for about half an hour’. A 27-year old Somali 
man said: ‘the guards […] whipped me with metal wire and beat and punched me all over my 
body. I also saw them hang four or five people upside-down from the tree outside the entrance 
door and then beat and whip their feet and stomach’. finally, a 21-year old Somali woman re-
ported the treatment received when she arrived with a group of 23 women: ‘the guards put us in 
a room, told us to take off our clothes and then put their fingers inside our vaginas’. See human 
Rights Watch, ‘Libya: Whipped, Beaten, and hung from Trees’, 22 June 2014, available at <http://
www.hrw.org/print/news/2014/06/22/libya-whipped-beaten-and-hung-trees>.
43 Madote.com, ‘Sudanese Court fines Rescued Illegal Ethiopian and Eritrean Migrants’, 7 
July 2014, available at <http://www.madote.com/2014/07/sudanese-court-fines-rescued-illegal.ht
ml?showComment=1404793379638>.
44 Bbc.com, ‘Migrant boat ‘shot at’ as it left Libya’, 13 October 2013, available at <http://www.bbc.
com/news/world-europe-24514340>; Repubblica.it, ‘Spunta video-choc: ‘fermati sennò muori’. 
Così i libici danno la caccia ai clandestini’, 18 May 2009, available at <http://www.repubblica.
it/2009/05/sezioni/cronaca/immigrati-8/clandestini-video/clandestini-video.html>.
45 See Repubblica.it, ‘Immigrazione, Alfano: Portare richieste asilo in Africa’, 31 October 
2014, available at <http://www.repubblica.it/politica/2014/10/31/news/immigrazione_alfano_porta 
re_richieste_asilo_in_africa-99445825/?ref=search>.
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5. hUMANITARIANISM: A STATE PREROGATIVE?
As says fassin,46 humanitarianism is part and parcel of global governmentality. 
however, while non-state actors (NGOs, private firms, political movements etc.) 
also participate in the humanitarian government of migration and borders, which 
means that states cannot monopolise the issue entirely, the latter still maintain 
a dominant position. This section summarises some cases showing that non-
state actors were de facto discouraged from rescuing people without the state’s 
authorisation even after the Cap Anamur case and the consequent rise of the 
humanitarian narrative.
In 2007 seven Tunisian fishermen rescued forty-four migrants on the high 
seas and brought them to Lampedusa: they were charged with facilitating illegal 
immigration and prosecuted by an Italian court. After four years they were ac-
quitted from all charges,47 like the accused of the Cap Anamur case, but in the 
meantime their fishing boats and fishing licenses had been confiscated, so their 
lives had been ruined.
furthermore, many vessels that happened to meet and assist migrants in 
distress were forced to wait in international waters for days and days, even more 
than a week, before Italy, Malta, the flag state, and sometimes other countries 
involved (e.g. Tunisia) decided who had to take the migrants. This was the case 
of vessels as different as the Spanish trawler Francisco y Catalina in 2006, the 
Turkish cargo Pinar in 2009, the Spanish Nato warship Almirante Juan de Bor-
bón in 2011 and the Greek-Liberian tanker Salamis in 2013, to name but a few. 
The fear of being prosecuted or simply wasting time and money ends up dis-
couraging non-state actors from rescuing people, which inevitably increases 
the risk of death for those attempting the sea crossing. The survivors of the 
Lampedusa tragedy of 3 October 2013 said private vessels did not stop to assist 
them during the journey. This was only one of the many occasions on which 
private seafarers reportedly turned a blind eye to migrants in distress. In Janu-
ary 2008, instead, a migrant was the victim of something more than indifference. 
four months after the Tunisian fishermen had been arrested for rescuing mi-
grants, an Italian fisherman was arrested on Lampedusa under the accusation 
of murder. he had met a boatload of migrants on the high seas. One of them 
had swum to his fishing-boat to ask for help, but the fisherman prevented him 
from getting on board by beating him and throwing him into the water. his body 
was never recovered.48
While they are discouraged from taking action upon their own initiative, private 
seafarers are often asked by state authorities to intervene on their behalf if they 
are close to boats in distress. In such cases, commercial ships are asked to 
take migrants on board and either hand them over to Italian navy ships or bring 
them to the nearest Italian port. On at least one occasion, however, Italy report-
46 D. fassin, Humanitarian Reason. A Moral History of the Present (Berkeley: University of 
California Press 2012).
47 Corte di Appello di Palermo, Terza Sezione Penale (21 September 2011).
48 See Repubblica.it, ‘Il comandante di un peschereccio accusato della morte di un naufrago’, 
11 January 2008, available at <http://www.repubblica.it/2007/11/sezioni/cronaca/immigrati-3/omi-
cidio-peschereccio/omicidio-peschereccio.html>.
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edly used a private vessel to circumvent the prohibition of refoulement: on 4 
August 2013 the Turkish commercial ship Adakent was asked by the Italian 
authorities to rescue a group of migrants in international waters, in the Libyan 
search and rescue zone. The migrants were brought to Tripoli, and it is unclear 
whether it was Italian or Libyan authorities that instructed them to do so. It is 
documented, instead, that on the same day the Italian authorities instructed the 
Greek-Liberian tanker Salamis to bring 102 rescued migrants from interna-
tional waters back to Libya, but the ship refused to do so and headed for Malta 
instead.49
finally, even state actors sometimes fail in what they claim to be their mission 
of rescuing people. A 2012 report by the Council of Europe has tried to shed 
light on the case of the ‘left-to-die boat’, a dinghy that remained adrift off Libyan 
coasts for two weeks in March 2011.50 63 passengers died, while the remaining 
nine survived only because they were washed up on the Libyan coast before it 
was too late. The report ascertained that Italian, Maltese and NATO authorities 
had been aware of the migrants being in distress but refrained from intervening. 
however, it was impossible to achieve a satisfactory degree of clarity on all 
responsibilities, because specific questions asked to specific agencies and 
authorities remained unanswered. More recently, on 11 October 2013, over 260 
people died after sending an SOS to the Italian authorities from the Maltese 
search and rescue zone, because Italy waited for Malta to take the lead of 
rescue operations, although an Italian navy ship was close to the sinking vessel, 
and when the rescue boats arrived, most migrants had already drowned.51 These 
two cases are exemplary of how the violence of the European border, well hid-
den behind the veil of humanitarianism, can operate ‘less through the direct 
action of a singular actor than through the inaction of many’.52 Sadly, however, 
49 Timesofmalta.com, ‘Update 8: Government requests ship master to return to rescue lo-
cation’, 5 August 2013, available at <http://www.timesofmalta.com/articles/view/20130805/local/
tanker-carrying-migrants.480832>; Amnesty International, ‘Lives Adrift, supra note 23, at 40-41; 
Council of Europe, ‘The left-to-die boat: actions and reactions’, Doc. 13532 (9 June 2014), avail-
able at <http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/xRef/x2h-xref-ViewPDf.asp?fileID=20940&lang=en>, 
at 11. The Italian deputy Interior minister f. Bubbico expressed the government’s position on both 
the Adakent and the Salamis case at a hearing before the Committee on Migration, Refugees and 
Displaced Persons of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on 4 february 2014, 
see Interno.gov.it, ‘Audizione del vice ministro sen. Bubbico presso la Commissione Migrazione 
dell’Assemblea Parlamentare del Consiglio d’Europa’ available at <http://www.interno.gov.it/it/
mininterno/export/sites/default/it/assets/files/28_2014/2014_02_05_audizione_bubbicoo_Con 
siglio_Europa.pdf>.
50 Council of Europe, ‘Lives lost in the Mediterranean Sea: who is responsible?’ (29 March 
2012), available at <http://assembly.coe.int/CommitteeDocs/2012/20120329_mig_RPT.EN.pdf>. 
See also C. heller, L. Pezzani and Situ Studio, ‘forensic Oceanography. Report on the Left-To-
Die Boat’, s.d., available at <http://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/fo-report.pdf >, and Council of Europe, 
‘The left-to-die boat: actions and reactions’, supra note 49.
51 f. Gatti, ‘Lampedusa, passing the buck of responsibilities: this is how they left the Syr-
ian children drown’ (28 November 2013), available at <http://espresso.repubblica.it/internazion-
ale/2013/11/28/news/lampedusa-buck-passing-on-the-massacre-so-they-left-syrians-children-
drown-1.143363>.
52 C. heller and L. Pezzani, ‘Liquid Traces: Investigating the Deaths of Migrants at the EU’s 
Maritime frontier’, in forensic Architecture (ed.), Forensis. The Architecture of Public Truth (Ber-
lin: Sternberg Press 2014), at 659.
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even Mare Nostrum’s direct action aimed at saving lives at sea proved unable 
to stop border deaths: over 3,000 people lost their lives in the Mediterranean in 
2014,53 and most of them died on the sea routes to Italy, in spite of the consid-
erable contribution to rescue activities provided by the Italian military/humanitar-
ian operation.54
6. ThE END Of MARE NOSTRUM AND ThE LAUNCh Of fRONTEx 
TRITON
Contrary to the announcements made by the Italian government in the summer, 
Mare Nostrum did not end completely on 31 October 2014 but was extended 
for a further two-month period. however, its budget and capacity were strongly 
reduced.55 If no further extension is granted, the Italian mission will expire on 
31 December 2014. The Italian calls for a European mission to take over the 
humanitarian tasks of Mare Nostrum remained unheard. The EU decided only 
to strengthen the presence of its border agency frontex in the waters surround-
ing Italy, by launching the operation Triton. On 1 November Triton replaced the 
two previously existing frontex operations hosted by Italy (Aeneas, controlling 
the waters south-east of Italy, off the coasts of Apulia and Calabria, and Hermes, 
patrolling the Strait of Sicily). 15 member states have already contributed to the 
new frontex mission by providing technical equipment and border guards, but 
the monthly budget allocated to Triton (2.9 million Euro) is less than a third of 
the budget of Mare Nostrum. furthermore, the frontex mission has officially no 
humanitarian mandate and is rather aimed at supporting the Italian authorities 
in controlling the border and collecting intelligence. however, following the hu-
manitarian rhetoric that also permeated the EU border agency in recent years,56 
frontex executive director G. Arias fernandez stressed that ‘saving lives will 
remain an absolute priority’.57 Again, the main difference with Mare Nostrum is 
supposed to be, besides the smaller budget available, the geographical extent 
of patrolling activities, since the area to be patrolled by frontex’ vessels and 
aircraft should not exceed 30 nautical miles from the Italian coastline, thus leav-
ing the zone next to Libyan territorial waters without any surveillance. however, 
53 T. Brian and f. Laczko, ‘Migrant Deaths: An International Overview’, in T. Brian and f. Lac-
zko (eds.), Fatal Journeys. Tracking Lives Lost during Migration (Geneva: International Organiza-
tion for Migration 2014), 15-43, at 20.
54 frontex has suggested that the mortality rate has increased (see supra note 22).
55 See supra note 45.
56 See N. Perkowski, ‘A normative assessment of the aims and practices of the European bor-
der management agency frontex’, 81 RSC Working Paper Series 2012, available at <http://www.
rsc.ox.ac.uk/files/publications/working-paper-series/wp81-normative-assessment-frontex-2012.
pdf>; G. Campesi, ‘frontex, the Euro-Mediterranean Border and the Paradoxes of humanitarian 
Rhetoric’, 2 South East European Journal of Political Science 2014, 126-134; K. franko Aas and 
h. Gundhus, ‘Policing humanitarian Borderlands: frontex, human Rights and the Precarious-
ness of Life’, British Journal of Criminology forthcoming.
57 frontex, ‘frontex Launches Joint Operation Triton’ (31 October 2014), available at <http://
frontex.europa.eu/news/frontex-launches-joint-operation-triton-JSYpL7>.
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Italian navy ships and aircraft will likely continue patrolling wider areas of the 
international waters, as they used to do even before Mare Nostrum.
7. CONCLUSIONS
Through a brief review of institutional documents and press reports, I have 
shown that the importance of the humanitarian narrative in the language of 
European policy-makers has increased since the turn of the century. The deci-
sion to present Mare Nostrum as a humanitarian mission was a further step in 
this process. In spite of the strong humanitarian rhetoric surrounding it, how-
ever, I have shown that Mare Nostrum is not much more humanitarian than 
previous patrolling activities carried out in the Strait of Sicily, the main difference 
being quantitative (the drastic budget increase) rather than qualitative. After 
pointing out that Mare Nostrum is also a security mission, I have then argued 
that its role must be analysed – and its degree of ‘humanitarianism’ assessed 
– against the background of the actual aims of Italian and European border 
policies, paying particular attention to the existing cooperation framework with 
Libya and other North African countries.
Such an analysis unveils the ambiguities of ‘humanitarianised’ border policies 
whose main aim, in fact, is still to prevent people from leaving and to deport the 
unwanted. Indeed, the concept of human security is used in order to enhance 
the safety and the right to asylum only of those who manage to leave Libyan, 
Egyptian or, more recently, Turkish coasts and are intercepted by Italian vessels 
after reaching international waters and before drowning or dying of dehydration. 
Since 2011, and especially after the Hirsi judgement, all Italian governments 
have declared that no more pushback operations will be carried out towards 
Libya, which is where most migrant boats come from. however, Italy is still 
engaged in strengthening international police cooperation in order to prevent 
migrants from leaving North African shores. far from seeing their human secu-
rity enhanced, people who are prevented from leaving countries such as Libya 
pay the human cost of Italian and European migration controls by suffering 
torture and inhuman and degrading treatments in North Africa. 
furthermore, the ‘left-to-die’ boats and the state’s attitude of de facto dis-
couraging private seafarers from rescuing people in distress at sea, as well as 
the reluctance of states to collect and disclose to the public information about 
border deaths, also raised the question about the monopoly of the state over 
human life and death,58 as well as about the dominant position of states in the 
humanitarian government of migration. It could be concluded that the humani-
tarian border is but a fig leaf for covering up exclusionary policies aimed at 
denying opportunities for asylum and protection in Europe. however, the impor-
tance of the change in the language of border policies should not be played 
58 See M. Albahari, ‘Death and the Moral State: Making Borders and Sovereignty at the South-
ern Edges of Europe’, 136 CCIS Working Paper 2006, available at <http://www.ccis-ucsd.org/
PUBLICATIONS/CCIS%20Albahari%20death%20and%20the%20moral%20state%20june%20
15%202006.pdf>.
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down too much. On the one hand, the use of words can be instrumental, but, 
on the other hand, it is also true that words can end up changing the minds, the 
attitudes and possibly the plans and actions of the actors involved, also includ-
ing policy-makers and border guards. In the future, this process might result in 
the human security of migrants to become the main concern not only of inter-
ception operations but also, and most of all, of migration and border policies as 
a whole.
